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SUDAN

Rising inter-tribal violence in the south and renewed clashes in Darfur cause new waves of displacement

As of May 2010, at least 4.9 million people are internally displaced in Darfur, the Greater Khartoum area, South Kordofan and the ten States of Southern Sudan, with unknown numbers of internally displaced people in the other northern and eastern States. They make up one of the two largest internally displaced populations in the world, alongside that of Colombia. Some people have been displaced for more than two decades, while others were newly displaced in 2009 and 2010.

In Southern Sudan over 390,000 people were newly displaced in 2009, twice as many as in 2008, and another 60,000 during the first four months of 2010. The increase in new displacement is a consequence of heightened inter and intra-tribal violence, attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and conflicts between pastoralist communities; poor governance, the proliferation of firearms and land disputes between returning IDPs, refugees and residents, all exacerbated by drought and food shortages. A new feature of the violence in 2009 was the deliberate targeting of women and children, who were often shot at water points, in the fields or while collecting firewood.

Five years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) over two million IDPs had returned to Southern Sudan by the end of 2009, but ten per cent of returns had led to secondary displacement. The achievement of durable solutions remains difficult due to rising insecurity and limited access to services, livelihoods and infrastructure.

Out of Darfur's population of six million, about 2.7 million were internally displaced in January 2009. Another two million people had been directly affected by the conflict. In addition, up to 100,000 people were newly displaced in the first months of 2010 by clashes between various rebels and government forces in Jebel Marra. After the expulsion of 13 international NGOs in March 2009, the Sudanese government started to take responsibility for all the operations that were previously carried out by the expelled NGOs and managed to avert a complete food security crisis. Nonetheless, serious gaps remain in the provision of health care and support for victims of gender-based violence. During the April 2010 elections, many IDPs were unable to register and were thus widely excluded.

ed from the elections. The prospect of durable solutions depends largely on achieving sustainable peace in the region.

The Greater Khartoum area continues to host over 624,000 IDPs in addition to an estimated 925,000 people from areas in or bordering the south, who have integrated in the host communities over the last 20 years. Many IDPs have been displaced for decades and do not intend to return, but still struggle with poor living conditions, and the lack of sustainable livelihood opportunities or basic services.

In January 2009 the government adopted a national IDP policy setting out IDPs' rights during different phases of displacement and the required responses to their needs. Sudan has also ratified but not yet implemented the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in Africa's Great Lakes Region, including the protocols on the protection and assistance of IDPs and on the property rights of returning populations. However, it has yet to sign and ratify the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa.



Source: United Nations - Cartographic Section
More maps are available at www.internal-displacement.org

Background and causes of displacement

As of May 2010, at least 4.9 million people are internally displaced in Darfur, the Greater Khartoum area, South Kordofan and the ten States of Southern Sudan, with unknown numbers of internally displaced people in the other northern and eastern States. Alongside Colombia they make one of the two largest internal displacement situations in the world. Some people have been displaced for more than two decades, while others were newly displaced in 2009 and 2010.

This displacement is a result of numerous conflicts that have been fuelled by the same cause: the deeply-rooted tensions between the centre and peripheral regions characterised by a highly inequitable division of power and wealth and a government unwilling to manage the country's diverse ethnic and religious make-up. After Sudan gained independence in 1956, conflict between north and south broke out almost immediately, while conflicts in the eastern and western regions of the country flared up later.

In Southern Sudan, the armed conflict that broke out soon after Sudan's independence ended in 1972, but in 1983 civil war resumed between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). It was brought to an end by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005. The CPA set out detailed transitional arrangements over a six-year interim period and addressed a number of issues, including power and wealth-sharing, security arrangements, and resolutions of conflicts in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (the Three Areas). It provided for an autonomous southern government, nationwide democratic elections that were held in April 2010 and a referendum to be held in 2011 in Southern Sudan on self-determination for the south (Sudan Tribune, 7 March 2010; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, January 2010; Chatham House, January 2010).

While the CPA brought an end to the conflict in the Three Areas, no agreement was reached on demarcating the border in the oil-rich area of Abyei. The matter was handed over to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague and a final decision from the Court was reached in July 2009 (UNSG, 17 April 2009, para.17). However there has been no progress in demarcating the border due to insecurity (Chatham House, January 2010, p.8; UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.16; HRW, 6 October 2009).

Along with Southern Sudan's decision on independence, the future of the Three Areas is also to be decided in 2011. The residents of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States will be given a chance to voice a desire for more autonomy from Khartoum at the popular consultation, which is nevertheless non-binding for the government (Sudan Tribune, 31 December 2009; Chatham House, 2010, p.6). Residents of Abyei, on the other hand, will have the right to choose whether they want to remain in the north or join the south in a referendum similar to the one in the Southern Sudan (Swissinfo, 30 December 2009).

Eastern Sudan is home to some three to four million of Sudan's poorest people (UNDP, 2010). Historical grievances and feelings of exclusion and marginalisation turned to violent conflict between the army and an insurgent coalition known as the Eastern Front in 1995 (Reuters, 12 April 2010; Pantuliano, September 2005). In October 2006 the two parties signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), but the implementation has been extremely slow and the Eastern States remain "profoundly underdeveloped" (HPG, 26 March 2009, p.3). The widespread presence of landmines in the region hampers the return of a number of IDPs to their places of origin (UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.65). There are no updated figures on the number of displaced; by the end of 2008 there were still up to 420,000 IDPs in the region.

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A new conflict erupted in early 2003, as two loosely allied rebel groups in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) took up arms against the Government of Sudan (GoS). As with Sudan's other conflicts, the causes of the war in Darfur lay in the central government's neglect and failure to share resources and wealth. After months of negotiations and pressure from the international community, the GoS and a faction of the SLM/A under the rebel leader Minni Minnawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. However, the DPA failed to bring peace and stability to the region as several rebel groups opposed the agreement. Instead it led to the fragmentation of rebel groups and sparked new waves of violence (Women's Commission, December 2008).

Following heavy fighting between JEM and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the rebel group and the government signed the Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence Building in January 2009 in Qatar, which committed the parties to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict (IRIN, 28 January 2009; UNSG, 17 April 2009). JEM suspended its participation in March, following the International Criminal Court's issue of an arrest warrant for President Bashir and the subsequent government decision to expel 13 international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and dissolve three national NGOs operating in north Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 24 April 2009). JEM and the government met again in Doha in May 2009 (IRIN, 18 May 2009), and in February 2010 they signed a ceasefire as a part of an agreement on the terms for peace negotiations (Reuters, 20 February 2010).

Despite these negotiations between JEM and the government, shortly after the ceasefire new fighting broke out in the Jebel Marra area between the SAF and a faction of the SLM/A, displacing thousands (Reuters, 25 February 2010; BBC, 25 February 2010).

Southern Sudan

The civil war between the government in Khartoum and the SPLA resulted in about four million Southern Sudanese being internally displaced and at least 500,000 refugees (HPG, 26 March, p.3).

The total number of IDPs in Southern Sudan in 2010 is difficult to determine due to ongoing population movements. However displacement reports in 2009, indicating over 390,000 internally displaced, are more than twice those of 2008 (Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, January 2009; OCHA, 17 February 2010). In the first four months of 2010, another 60,000 people have been displaced, bringing the total number of newly displaced people since January 2009 to 450,000 (WFP, April 2010; IRIN, 23 April 2010). This rise is a consequence of several factors: increased inter and intra-tribal violence exacerbated by drought and food shortages and related migration conflicts between pastoralist groups and between pastoralists and agriculturalists; the increase in intensity and frequency of attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); the proliferation of firearms and GoSS's inability to undertake civilian disarmament; and the overall poor governance and mounting land disputes among returning IDPs, refugees, and residents (Small Arms Survey, Working Paper, April 2010; ICG, 23 December 2009; NGO coalition, 2010; FEWS NET, 31 March 2010). There has also been a change in the nature of violence. While inter-tribal cattle rustling is common in these areas, in 2009 the violence within tribes increased. Villages were targeted and women and children were often shot at water points, in the fields or while collecting firewood (OCHA, 30 September 2009; Office of the UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator, 11 September 2009; Small Arms Survey, Issue Brief and Working Paper, April 2010; MSF, December 2009).

Of the estimated four million IDPs displaced by the civil war, IOM has estimated that between the 2005 signing of the CPA and December 2009, over two million IDPs returned to Southern Sudan, Abyei and Southern Kordofan, but ten per cent of those movements led to secondary displacement (IOM, December 2009, p.8; UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.95). The achievement of durable solutions by returnees remained difficult. In addition to facing rising insecurity, returnees frequently arrive in areas that lack infrastructure, with limited access to basic services, including clean water and livelihood opportunities. Southern Sudan is also one of the poorest areas in the world, with widespread malnutrition and health indicators among the worst in the world (UN and partners, 11 December 2009).

According to the Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment 2009/2010 (ANLA) and several inter-agency assessments, Southern Sudan faced a massive food deficit caused by a combination of late rains, disruption of trade and high food prices. While results of the 2008/2009 ANLA had indicated that IDPs and returnees faced greater food insecurity than non-displaced residents, the 2009/2010 assessment found that IDPs were still much worse off than the residents but the difference between residents and returnees was very slight (WFP, December 2009; WFP, ANLA Final, February 2010). This underlines the severity of the food security situation in 2009 compared to previous years, when the resident populations were normally better off and among food secure groups (WFP, December 2009).

Insecurity played a major role in limiting cultivation in 2009, as many people were displaced from their fields and so failed to cultivate for the season (FEWS NET, November 2009). At the start of 2010, Jonglei was reported to be the State with the largest number of conflict incidents; by mid January 2010, there were 105,000 IDPs in the State (FEWS NET, 22 January 2010). Those who failed to cultivate in 2009 were expected to remain highly food

insecure in 2010 (FEWS NET, 31 March 2010).

Following the signing of the CPA, donor governments pledged up to \$2 billion in aid to the south Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTFs) to fund projects and programmes for the reconstruction of Southern Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 18 February 2010). It was anticipated that the fund, administered by the World Bank, would play a leading role in contracting third parties to deliver government services for at least two years of the interim period. Its role would be phased out as the capacity of GoSS increased. By the end of 2009, donors had provided \$524 million to the MDTF, and of that, only \$181 million had been spent by the World Bank. The complex procurement rules imposed by the World Bank on the GoSS had reportedly led to delays and frustration (Guardian, 18 February 2010; OECD, 2009, pp.79-83, 146-147).

As of mid-2010, the GoSS has not managed to offer displaced Southern Sudanese a genuine choice between return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country. It has exclusively promoted return to areas of origin as the only settlement option. However, many IDPs would prefer to integrate in the towns in the south they fled to or settle in other urban areas, to better access services and livelihoods.

IDPs in towns and cities face a number of obstacles to achievement of durable solutions: first, IDPs who fled to the towns during the war often squatted on land that was unoccupied at the time but was either privately owned or owned by the state. In towns such as Juba, many of them have since faced eviction, either because the private owners of the land are themselves returning from displacement and are reclaiming their plots, or because the local authorities have started developing the land (UN Resident Coordinator, 5 May 2009; RCSO et al, 10 February 2009; Governor of Central Equatoria State, 16 January 2009; UNSC, 19 January 2010, p.66). Second, SPLA soldiers in Southern Sudan occupied urban plots in towns

such as Juba and Yei during the war, and have refused to vacate the plots when the owners return. In some cases, soldiers have claimed they are entitled to the land because they fought in the war against the northern army to free the land from northern occupation (HRW, February 2009, pp.31-32; IRIN, 7 October 2008; ODI, December 2007, p.5; Small Arms Survey, Issue Brief, April 2010, p.5).

Darfur

Out of Darfur's total population of six million, about 2.7 million were internally displaced by January 2009 and living in camps. A further two million people had been directly affected by the conflict. Following clashes between various rebels and government armed forces, up to 140,000 people were newly displaced in the first months of 2009, and up to 100,000 in the first months of 2010 (AFP, 6 March 2009; Office of the UN Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan, 2009; UN and partners, 11 December 2009; Reuters, 25 February 2010; IRIN, 3 March 2010).

IDPs in Darfur have continued to face serious threats to their physical security from the army and militias allied to the government, rebel groups and bandits. There were also reports of the LRA moving into Darfur in early 2010 (Sudan Tribune, 13 March 2010; Enough, 12 March 2010). In January 2010, the government troops launched an offensive on the SLA-held Jebel Marra area, displacing up to 100,000 people (OCHA, 1 March 2010). The access of these IDPs to health services, clean water and food security has been seriously strained due to limited humanitarian access and suspension of humanitarian operations in the area (IRIN, 3 March 2010). In Darfur, internally displaced women and men face different risks and challenges: men are more likely to pursue economic opportunities in towns, where they are often victims of theft and robbery. Women, who often engage in farming and other livelihood activities outside

towns, face the threat of rape and other gender-based violence (UN SC, 29 October 2009, p.64).

The March 2009 expulsion of 13 international NGOs and the disbandment of three Sudanese aid organisations affected hundreds of thousands of people in Darfur, with the sectors of water and sanitation, hygiene and nutrition most seriously affected (HPG, 26 March 2009; UN SC, 13 July 2009). The expulsions combined with security concerns led to a decreased humanitarian presence outside the State capitals of Northern, Southern and Western Darfur. Besides reducing the delivery of aid to people in remote areas, this reduced humanitarian presence also led to limitations on early warning reporting (UN and partners, 11 December 2009). However, a year after the expulsion, the feared food crisis had not materialised. According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Darfur, the departure of foreign humanitarian workers "has led us to collaborate even more closely with local associations, establishing a network of contacts on the territory that did not exist before and we also started to meet more frequently with the Sudanese government, which really did start to take responsibility for all the operations that were previously carried out by the expelled organizations" (MISNA, 4 March 2010). It is noteworthy that the humanitarian response after the expulsion has largely focused on life-saving sectors such as food and water and sanitation, while leaving gaps in some other sectors. Provision of effective health care services has been an ongoing challenge, and support for rape survivors and other victims of gender-based violence has collapsed completely and remains unaddressed (UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.28; The New Republic, 14 October 2009; UN SC, 29 October 2009, p.21).

Food security has improved in some areas and worsened in others. In February 2010 the Darfur Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS) found that in North Darfur, food security among surveyed IDPs and residents significantly declined,

from food security to moderate food insecurity; in South Darfur food security for IDPs had deteriorated compared to the same period in 2009, while for communities with both IDPs and residents food security had somewhat improved with 34 per cent severely food insecure compared to the 50 per cent in 2009; in West Darfur, food security had greatly improved for both internally displaced as well as residents (WFP, Monthly Situation Report, February 2010).

The majority of IDPs in Darfur have been excluded from census and electoral processes. Most IDPs boycotted the fifth national population and housing census in 2008, and the results were rejected by all of Sudan's rebel groups, in part owing to their concerns about the exclusion of IDPs and other conflict-affected communities, and about the counting as Sudanese citizens of foreign (mainly Chadian) nationals who had been allowed by the Sudanese authorities to settle on land from which Darfurians had fled (ICG, 30 March 2010; HRC, 2 September 2008, para.15; Sudan Tribune, 31 March 2008; IWPR, 25 November 2009; The Independent, 14 July 2007).

The manipulated census results had a direct impact on multi-party elections in April 2010, as they were used to add constituencies in areas where the National Congress Party (NCP) supporters were in the majority, and remove them elsewhere (ICG, 17 December 2009, p.4). Approximately two million IDPs in Darfur have also been widely excluded from voting. Many were unable to register as, to do so, they would first have to return to their areas of origin which had in many cases been occupied by others. Many who had settled in IDP camps refused to register there as they were concerned that they would then lose the right to vote in their home areas and possibly lose the rights over their land (Reeves, 20 April 2010; Sudan Tribune, 15 March 2010; ICG, 17 December 2009, p.4).

The prospect of durable solutions for the 2.7 million IDPs who live in camps depends largely on the achievement of sustainable peace in the region. In the past, the government in Khartoum had encouraged and possibly forced return to areas of origin, despite insecurity, with land occupied by Arab tribal groups, and without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and health care (Reeves, 6 August 2009; US Special Envoy to Sudan, 10 August 2009; Reuters, 25 February 2010). Since insecurity and other access constraints made verification of returns an ongoing challenge, the government and international partners endorsed the Joint Verification Mechanism for Returns in October 2009. The Mechanism is intended to ensure that any returns in Darfur are voluntary, and that the return areas have the necessary capacity in terms of basic infrastructure and food supplies to receive the returnees (OCHA, January 2010, p.2).

The protracted and large-scale nature of displacement has led many IDP camps to become urban settlements. Many IDPs would prefer to locally integrate in these camps in the hope that they become urban neighbourhoods as they did in Khartoum throughout the 1990s, when the city's rapid growth engulfed the official IDP camps previously outside the urban areas (de Waal, 31 March 2009; Tufts University-IDMC, August 2008, p.18). The percentage of Darfurians in urban settlements has doubled from 18 to 35 per cent between 2003 and 2009, with forced displacement leading to unplanned urbanisation and environmental degradation. (DHP No. 34, January 2009, p.18; de Waal, 31 March 2009; UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.37-38).

Khartoum

Estimates for the total number of IDPs (from the south, Darfur, and the east) in the Greater Khartoum area vary widely. The estimates of the number of southern Sudanese in Khartoum range

from at least two million, as maintained by the SPLM, to a figure of just over 500,000 provided by the census, the results of which were released in May 2009 (UNHCR, December 2009; Sudan Tribune, 24 May 2009; Chatham House, January 2010, p.19; GoS, 9 April 2010, p.1). In 2008, the Tufts-IDMC survey found that Khartoum hosts between 1.3 and 1.7 million IDPs (in camps and outside the camps and resettlement areas), most of them from the south (Tufts-IDMC, August 2008). According to the GoS's study of IDPs in Khartoum released in April 2010, about 624,000 IDPs were living in Khartoum by the end of 2009, including those who had returned to the south but since returned to Khartoum after failing to re-establish themselves in their places of origin (GoS, 9 April 2010; UN and partners, 19 November 2008; Tufts-IDMC, August 2008). In addition, an estimated 1.5 million IDPs had integrated in Khartoum over the previous 20 years, with 59 per cent (925,000) of them originating from the south and the Three Areas (GoS, 9 April 2010). The survey used the completion of legal procedures for acquiring land plots as the criteria for classifying people as having locally integrated. Many southern IDPs had been displaced for years or decades (with children having been born in displacement), had integrated economically if not socially, and did not intend to return (GoS, 9 April 2010; UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.37). There is, however, insufficient information on the living conditions and specific needs of the 1.5 million people who have, according to the GoS study, locally integrated to determine whether they have indeed achieved a durable solution.

Most IDPs in Khartoum live outside the camps and resettlement areas (between one and 1.3 million), some 300,000 to 400,000 live in IDP camps where they have been allocated plots, and some squat on privately owned land (Tufts-IDMC, August 2008, GoS, 9 April 2010). Although Khartoum has seen strong economic growth in recent years, this growth has not been evenly spread and IDP locations generally offer poor living conditions, and

few sustainable livelihood opportunities or basic services (GoS, 9 April 2010; Landinfo, 3 November 2008, pp.12-13).

During the registration of voters for the 2010 elections in Khartoum, observers noted that there was reported under-registration in areas with large number of IDPs (IDP Action, 11 March 2010). Khartoum State also had the lowest percentage registration of any State in the country (UNMIS, 15 March 2010).

In the 2011 referendum, the southern Sudanese living in the north who were born after 1956 will be eligible to vote in their place of residence, while those who were born before 1956 and live in the north must vote in the south; therefore the final procedures of referendum voting mean that most Southerners in the north are unlikely to exercise their vote in the south (Chatham House, 2010, p.16, box 6).

National response

In January 2009 the government adopted a national IDP policy, setting out IDPs' rights and the required responses to their needs during different phases of displacement. The policy recognises the civil and political, and the economic, social and cultural rights of IDPs; applies to all levels of government; strives to enhance social life and sustainable development within IDP and host communities; promotes voluntary return or settlement to other places of IDPs's choice; and determines the roles and responsibilities of all actors involved in the planning of projects and programmes concerning IDPs. It establishes the High Committee to review displacement-related policies and plan the protection of and assistance to IDPs. The Humanitarian Aid Commission (representing the Government of National Unity) and the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (representing GoSS) are to assume the roles of coordinator bodies between the government and

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other national and international actors involved, and provide overall technical support for relevant programmes and plans (Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009; Brookings, 2010).

Sudan has also ratified the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in Africa's Great Lakes Region, including the Pact's Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to IDPs, and the Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Populations. Implementation of these instruments has yet to commence by mid-2010. By mid-2010, Sudan had not yet signed or ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (the Kampala Convention), which was adopted by the AU in October 2009.

International response

Sudan is home to the largest humanitarian operation in the world, with estimated needs at the start of 2010 totalling \$1.88 billion (UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.12). Sudan is also the only country in the world with two international peacekeeping missions: the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

Most of UNMIS's mandate falls under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Its primary task is to support the implementation of the CPA. There is also a Chapter VII component to the mandate (authorising use of force), whereby UNMIS is tasked with protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs; and contributing to international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan. The mandate of UNMIS currently runs until 30 April 2011.

UNMIS has been criticised for failing to fulfil its mandate to protect civilians. Observers have commented that the problem lies at the field level: "Awareness or understanding of the mission's civilian protection responsibilities is limited or non-existent, with some UNMIS personnel entirely unaware of the Chapter VII component of the mandate, or believing that protecting civilians from 'tribal violence' or the LRA falls outside of the mission mandate and is a distraction from its core business of supporting CPA implementation [Oxfam interviews with UNMIS military and civilian personnel, Rumbek, Lakes State and Yambio, Western Equatoria, September 2009]" (NGO coalition, 2010, p.15). Several UN Security Council resolutions also urged UNMIS to make full use of its capabilities to provide protection to civilians (NGO coalition, 2010, p.15; UN, November 2009, pp.329-330).

UNAMID replaced the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in January 2008, and has currently been authorised until 31 July 2010 to support the implementation of the DPA between the GoS and the faction of the SLM/A under the rebel leader Minni Minnawi. UNAMID's effectiveness has been undermined by the failure of the international community to support the operation with sufficient equipment and troops; UNAMID personnel have come under attack and have faced restrictions on their freedom of movement imposed by the government (AllAfrica, 7 May 2010; Sudan Tribune, 2 March 2010; UN SC, 13 July 2009, para.34; UN SC, 29 January 2010, para.31; UN SG, 14 April 2009, para.34).

Note: This is a summary of IDMC's internal displacement profile on Sudan. The full profile is available online [here](#).

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About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people.

In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.

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